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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 
2001), we upheld the validity of a defendant’s waiver of 
appellate rights following his guilty plea. This appeal presents 
the novel question of whether a waiver of certain post-
conviction rights nullifies an appellate waiver. We hold that it 
does not.  
I 
 In January 2012, Craig A. Grimes, a former professor 
of materials science and engineering at Pennsylvania State 
University and the sole owner of three research companies, 
agreed to plead guilty to a three-count information charging 
him with: wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; false 
statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and money 
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The charges 
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stemmed from Grimes’s fraudulent conduct involving federal 
science grants. In brief, Grimes secured grants for which he 
was ineligible, stated that he would use one grant to conduct 
research that never actually occurred, and used grant money 
for personal and non-grant-related purposes.   
 Grimes and his attorney signed a plea agreement in 
which the Government indicated that his advisory sentencing 
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines would 
be 41 to 51 months in prison. The plea agreement also 
contained the following waiver of Grimes’s direct and 
collateral appeal rights:  
[T]he defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waives the right to appeal any conviction and 
sentence imposed by the Court . . . provided 
that the sentence is below or within the 
guideline range determined by the Court. The 
Defendant also knowingly and voluntarily 
waives the Defendant’s right to challenge his 
guilty plea, conviction or sentence, or the 
manner in which the sentence was determined 
in any collateral proceeding, including but not 
limited to a motion brought under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 2255. 
Above Grimes’s signature on the last page of the agreement 
was an acknowledgement stating that he had read the 
agreement, carefully reviewed it with his attorney, understood 
it, and voluntarily agreed to it. Above his attorney’s signature 
was an acknowledgement that she too had carefully reviewed 
every part of the agreement with her client and that, to her 
knowledge, Grimes’s decision to enter into it was informed 
and voluntary. 
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 In February 2012, Grimes pleaded guilty before United 
States Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson.
1
 During his plea 
colloquy, Grimes confirmed under oath that he was 56 years 
old, had a Ph.D., and was satisfied with the representation his 
counsel had provided. He stated that he understood the 
charges against him, as well as his rights and his potential 
defenses. He waived his right to an indictment and to a jury 
trial. Grimes also represented that he had voluntarily signed 
the plea agreement and had enough time to review it with his 
attorney before signing it. Finally, Grimes stated that no one 
had pressured him to sign the agreement, said he was signing 
it of his own free will, and acknowledged that no one could 
guarantee how the District Court would sentence him. The 
Magistrate Judge summarized the charges, potential penalties, 
and sentencing guidelines, ensuring that Grimes understood 
them.  
 The Magistrate Judge then specifically discussed the 
appellate waiver with Grimes: 
THE COURT: Now, ordinarily you would have 
the right to later bring proceedings such as a 
direct appeal or a collateral challenge to 
challenge your conviction and sentence. Do you 
understand that this plea agreement has 
provisions in it which limit[] your ability to take 
an appeal?  
GRIMES: Yes, Your Honor.  
                                                 
1
 Grimes consented to proceed before a magistrate 
judge for the purpose of entering a guilty plea, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b).  
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THE COURT: And I’m directing your attention 
to paragraph 24 on page 16 of the written plea 
agreement. 
GRIMES: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you review that paragraph 
specially with counsel? 
GRIMES: Yes, sir, I did. 
THE COURT: And did you voluntarily agree to 
waive those appellate rights? 
GRIMES: Uh-huh, yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And what I note is that 
paragraph provides that you would waive 
appellate rights with the exception of any 
sentence that might exceed the guideline 
imprisonment range, and that you would also 
waive any right to collaterally challenge any 
sentence in a proceeding brought under Title 28 
of the U.S. Code, Section 2255, with the 
exception of a sentence that might exceed the 
guideline imprisonment range. That is my 
understanding of the waiver in this case. Is that 
correct, [Assistant U.S. Attorney]? 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY: That is 
correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is that your understanding 
of the waiver, Mr. Grimes? 
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GRIMES: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And did you voluntarily waive 
that right after discussing with your attorney 
your right to appeal and the nature of what you 
were giving up in that paragraph? 
GRIMES: Uh-huh, yes, sir, I did.  
The Magistrate Judge accepted Grimes’s plea, finding it 
knowing and voluntary, and issued a report recommending 
that the District Court do the same. In March, Chief District 
Judge Yvette Kane adopted the report and accepted the guilty 
plea.  
 In November 2012, the District Court sentenced 
Grimes to 41 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. After announcing the 
sentence, the District Court reminded Grimes that although he 
had a right to appeal, he had limited that right under the 
waiver in the plea agreement. “These waivers are usually 
enforceable, but if you believe that the waiver you executed 
in this case is unenforceable, you are entitled to present that 
theory to the appellate court,” the District Court said. This 
timely appeal followed.
2
  
II 
 Grimes argues that we should find his appellate waiver 
invalid and address the merits of his appeal. He contends that 
                                                 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
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his appellate waiver was not knowing and voluntary because 
it contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his 
guilty plea, conviction, or sentence that did not exempt Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
According to Grimes, he could not have knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed to waive his appellate rights because his 
trial counsel faced an inherent, actual conflict of interest in 
negotiating and advising him on the waiver. Grimes insists 
that this conflict pitted his own interest as a criminal 
defendant against his attorney’s reputational and professional 
interest in avoiding future ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Grimes also argues that even if we find his appellate 
waiver to be knowing and voluntary, we should still refuse to 
enforce it to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The Government 
urges us to enforce the waiver and dismiss this appeal.  
 A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily 
waive many fundamental constitutional rights, including the 
right to a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination. Khattak, 
273 F.3d at 561 (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 
196, 201 (1995)). The ability to waive statutorily created 
rights, such as the right to appeal a criminal conviction, 
logically flows from a defendant’s ability to waive 
constitutional rights. Id. Thus, “[w]e will enforce an appellate 
waiver and decline to review the merits of an appeal where 
we conclude (1) that the issues [the defendant] pursues on 
appeal fall within the scope of his appellate waiver and (2) 
that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate 
waiver, unless (3) enforcing the waiver would work a 
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 
412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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We review the validity and scope of an appellate waiver de 
novo. Id. 
 Here, there is no dispute regarding the scope of 
Grimes’s appellate waiver following the imposition of his 
within-Guidelines sentence. Thus, we turn to whether Grimes 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal and 
whether enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of 
justice.  
A 
Grimes claims that his waiver was not knowing and 
voluntary because his attorney’s alleged conflict of interest 
left him without “the effective assistance of counsel to which 
he was entitled in connection with the negotiation and entry 
of a guilty plea.” Grimes Br. at 22. Grimes does not seek to 
withdraw his plea, but challenges only the waiver.  
 We have not directly addressed whether ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the negotiation of an appellate waiver 
renders that waiver invalid, although we have suggested that 
it could. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (noting the absence of allegations that counsel was 
ineffective “in negotiating the very plea agreement that 
contained the waiver”); United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 
292, 298 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “[e]nforcing a 
collateral-attack waiver where constitutionally deficient 
lawyering prevented [defendant] from understanding his plea 
. . . would result in a miscarriage of justice”). 
 Grimes claims he was “adversely affected by his 
attorney’s actual conflict of interest in that counsel had to 
advise the client whether to waive all claims on collateral 
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attack, including the client’s right to challenge the attorney’s 
own ineffective assistance, where it might well be in [his] 
interests to preserve the opportunity to advance such a 
challenge.” Grimes Br. at 27. He attempts to bootstrap that 
challenge to his waiver of collateral rights onto his appellate 
waiver with the declaration that the two waivers are 
“intertwined.” We are unpersuaded. 
 In our view, waivers of appellate rights and collateral 
attack rights are analytically distinct. Even accepting for the 
sake of argument Grimes’s contention that it is an 
impermissible conflict of interest for a lawyer to negotiate “a 
guilty plea that purports to waive all claims affecting the 
conviction or sentence, not excluding ineffective assistance of 
counsel, including those claims which might involve that 
same lawyer’s performance,” Grimes Br. at 25–26, a conflict 
exists only insofar as the waiver prevents us from hearing 
claims we would otherwise hear. As we have noted, 
ineffective assistance claims are rarely cognizable on direct 
appeal. United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 198 (3d Cir. 
2008). Thus, unless the record in Grimes’s case shows “an 
actual conflict of interest [that is] clear on the record,” id. 
(citing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 
133–34 (3d Cir. 1984)), we would not entertain his ineffective 
assistance claim at this stage, waiver or not.  
 This appeal is unlike the situation we confronted in 
Zepp, where we reached the merits of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim based on conflict of interest on 
direct appeal. There, the ineffective assistance claim was 
cognizable on direct appeal because defense counsel’s actions 
in the proceedings below “put the trial court on notice with 
respect to the issue of conflict of interest” and provided 
sufficient information for review. Zepp, 748 F.2d at 134 & 
 10 
 
n.9. By contrast, the record in Grimes’s appeal is devoid of 
any allegation of conflict of interest. Grimes faults the 
Magistrate Judge who conducted his plea colloquy for not 
inquiring, sua sponte, into a potential conflict of interest, but 
he cites no precedent to support that imperative in this factual 
context. Grimes also asserts conclusorily that the alleged 
conflict adversely affected him, but does not specify what he 
would have done differently had he been aware of the 
purported conflict. He seeks only to negate the waiver, not 
withdraw his plea, but it is unclear whether the plea would 
have been available or how it would have otherwise looked 
had the waiver either been excised or reworded in light of 
Grimes’s concerns.  
 Instead, Grimes asks us to find appellate waivers 
invalid per se if they do not “carve out claims of ineffective 
assistance concerning the same attorney who counseled the 
plea.” Grimes Br. at 28. We undoubtedly will have occasion 
to address that issue in another case, but we decline to do so 
on these facts.
3
 We hold merely that Grimes’s waiver of his 
right to appeal was knowing and voluntary and that the plea 
                                                 
3
 In so doing, we acknowledge the ethical concerns 
noted by the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and at least eight states’ legal ethics arbiters. See 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Formal 
Opinion 12-02 (Oct. 2012) (“[I]t is NACDL’s position that 
defense counsel has an ethical and constitutional duty to 
object to and refuse to sign any plea agreement provision that 
amounts to a waiver of post-conviction remedies. This 
protects the rights of the client to later challenge the 
representation of the lawyer.”). 
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agreement’s inclusion of a waiver of his collateral attack 
rights did nothing to vitiate his valid appellate waiver.  
III 
 Grimes argues in the alternative that even if his 
appellate waiver is valid, it should not be enforced because to 
do so would constitute a miscarriage of justice. To determine 
whether enforcing a waiver works a miscarriage of justice, we 
consider  
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its 
character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, 
a sentencing guideline, or a statutory 
maximum), the impact of the error on the 
defendant, the impact of correcting the error on 
the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result. 
Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 
257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2001)). To qualify as a 
miscarriage of justice, “[i]t is not enough that an issue [is] 
meritorious”; after all, appellate waivers are intended to 
preclude review not just of frivolous questions, but of 
difficult and debatable legal issues we would otherwise 
consider. United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 136 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2013). Rather, the miscarriage of justice exception to 
appellate waivers applies only in “unusual circumstance[s] . . 
. with the aim of avoiding manifest injustice.” Id. at 136 
(internal quotations and citation marks omitted). In Castro, 
for instance, we reached the merits and overturned a 
conviction despite an appellate waiver because the record 
showed “a complete failure of proof on an essential element 
of the charged crime.” Id. at 139. Allowing a conviction to 
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stand under those circumstances would have seriously 
impugned “the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our 
courts” and constituted a true miscarriage of justice. Id. 
 Here, Grimes contends his sentence was unreasonable 
compared to the punishment others received for similar or 
worse conduct. Specifically, he describes the District Court’s 
alleged “failure . . . to give adequate consideration to the need 
to avoid unwarranted disparities with defendants in other 
cases across different districts” as “a failure to satisfy one of 
the most fundamental of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors in 
terms of its role in the non-mandatory guidelines world.” 
Grimes Br. at 35–36. Grimes argues that he would have 
received a lesser sentence if the District Court had more 
thoroughly considered his disparity argument.  
 Although “there may well be unusual situations in 
which an unreasonable sentence, standing alone, could 
require invalidating [a] waiver to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice,” such situations are rare, especially in light of our 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing 
sentencing appeals. United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 
244 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding no miscarriage-of-justice waiver 
exception to defendant’s challenge to the reasonableness of 
her sentence). This case is not one of those unusual situations, 
in large part because it does “not implicate fundamental rights 
or constitutional principles.” Mabry, 536 F.3d at 243. Indeed, 
Grimes’s challenge to his bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence 
is precisely the type of appeal his appellate waiver was 
intended to foreclose. Accordingly, we hold that Grimes’s 
miscarriage of justice argument falls well short.  
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IV 
 In sum, we hold that Craig Grimes knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence. His valid 
appellate waiver is unaffected by the waiver of his right to 
collaterally attack his sentence, and to enforce his appellate 
waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, 
we will dismiss Grimes’s appeal. 
